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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
THE ECONOMIC IMPAC'r
DISCLOSURE ACT

State administrative agencies have substantial power to regulate
the economic transactions of private individuals. 1 Since the applicable statutory guidelines are often vague or ambiguous, agencies
enjoy considerable discretion in their exercise of that power. 2
Certain doctrines have been developed to limit the discretion of
regulatory agencies, notably an insistence on procedural
safeguards and a requirement that the agency have substantial
evidence to support its factfinding. 3 Yet, these doctrines have not
been a sufficient check on the discretion of the administrative
agencies.
While the traditional concern with agency discretion is that
agency decision-making will be biased in favor of the regulated
industries, 4 agencies are also criticized for failing to investigate the
impact of their policies on the regulated client and the resulting
cost to consumers. 5 This failure prevents the agency from responding adequately to the legitimate interests of either tbe business

' Examples of the various types of state agencies can be found in I F. CooPER,' STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (1965). Although many state agencies are not directly concerned
with regulating private economic transactions. this note focuses upon the effect of the
Economic Impact Disclosure Act, see Part II infra, on state agencies acting in their
regulatory capacities.
2
State courts have been more willing to strike down broad delegations of power to
administrative agencies than have the federal courts. See I F. CooPER, supra note I, at
31-91. Yet, Cooper concludes that "almost any extent of discretionary power may be
delegated if public safety is significantly involved. and if there is need for the exercise of an
expert judgment which the agency undoubtedly possesses, and if its procedures afford fair
hearings. and adequate judicial review is provided." Id. at 91.
3
See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1681-88 (I 975).
4
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-47 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Thill Sec. Corp. v. New Yori( Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264,273 (7th Cir. 1970); Moss v. CAB,
430 F.2d 891. 902 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process:
A Reevaluation. 67 HARV. L. REV. I 105, 1107-13 (1954); Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators
and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1975).
5
The Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975, ch. 76-1, § I, 1976 Fla. Laws I
(repealed by Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 750). See note 55 infra:
Kennedy, Regulatory Reform: A Confused National Issue, 28 Ao. L. REV. 447 (1976);
Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 Ao. L. REv. 415, 416-17
(1976); S\:hwartz, The Deregulation of Industry: A Built-In Bias, 51 IND. L.J. 718, 719
(1976).
.
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community or consumers. This note examines a recently developed procedure designed to improve the agency decisionmaking process by requiring economic prediction of the effect
which agency activities will have prior to agency action.
In particular, this note examines three issues. Part II focuses on
whether requiring a detailed economic impact statement, 6 applicable to all state agencies, establishes an appropriate method for
generating and disclosing relevant economic information to agency
decision makers and the public. Part III discusses whether
economic analysis provides an objective technique which can effectively limit the discretionary powers of state administrative
af,encies. Part IV evaluates the probable impact of this economic
information upon the agency decision-making process. This note
concludes that a formal, judicially reviewable procedure for predicting economic impacts is not justified given its considerable
costs and its limited potential either for reducing agency discretion
or for increasing agency responsiveness.

I.

IMPACT STATEMENTS

An impact statement is a procedural mechanism designed to
improve agency decision-making and to limit agency discretion. It
differs from other legislative controls over administrative action,
such as a legislative veto or committee oversight, since it prescribes procedures for agency evaluation of the proposed action
and consideration of possible alternatives rather than relying upon
legislative review of a final agency action. A prescriptive limitation
of this type should be more effective than other techniques· of
legislative control since it alleviates the inability of the legislature
to review effectively more than a handful of the agency's actions. 7

" As examples of bills imposing a broad-ranging requirement of economic ·analysis and
disclosure, this note examines a Florida bill which was passed and subsequently repealed
and a similar bill considered in Michigan. See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra. ·
7
Effective legislative oversight of the activities of administrative agencies is rare because
of the complexity of the subject matter, the lack of adequate staff. the inaccessibility of
independent information, and the lack of political benefits from participation in oversight
activities. Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function. 23 KAN. L.
REv. 277, 281-83 (1975). For a brief discussion of some recent proposals to insure more
effective congressional oversight over the federal regulatory bureaucracy. see Ribicoff,
supra note 5, at 421-27.
Florida and Michigan both provide for committee oversight over proposed administrative
rules. For a description of the history and present operation of the oversight process in the
two states. see Note, Can the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee Adequately Solve
Administrative Conflict?. 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 350, 350~51, 357-58 (1976).
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The pioneering effort in impact statements was the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 8 NEPA requires all
federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement
before undertaking any activity which will have significant environmental consequences. 9 By requiring preparation prior to
agency activity, Congress sought to provide decision-makers with
detailed information as an aid in determining whether to proceed
with a program or project, and to disclose to the public relevant
environmental information on proposed agency activity .10
Fulfilling these dual purposes requires an elaborate series of
steps in the preparation of environmental impact statements. The
federal agencies must develop criteria for identifying those actions
likely to require environmental impact statements.11 If the agency
determines that a contemplated project requires the preparation of
a statement, a draft environmental impact statement must be prepared.12 The draft statement is then reviewed by other federal and
state agencies and made available for public comment. 13 The final
environmental impact statement is then prepared with the agency

8
42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
• NEPA requires all agencies of the federal government to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U .S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
.
10
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); Calvert Cliffs' Coord.
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11
See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1975); Baum, Canary, Reeve & Scott, Negative
NEPA: The Decision Not to File, 6 ENv. LAW 309 (1976).
12
The Council on Environmental Quality's guidelines offer an optimistic appraisal of the
role of draft environmental impact statements in the decision-making process.
It is important that draft environmental impact statements be prepared and
circulated for comment ... as early as possible in the agency review process in
order to permit agency decision-makers and outside reviewers to give meaningful
consideration to the environmental issues involved. In particular, agencies should
keep in mind that such statements are to serve as the means of assessing the
environmental impact of proposed agency actions, rather than as a justification for
decisions already made. This means that draft statements on administrative actions
should be prepared and circulated for comment prior to the first significant point of
decision in the agency review process.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1975). Others have questioned whether these guidelines are an
accurate reflection of the actual agency decision-making process. See notes 19-21 and
accompanying text infra.
13
40 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1975).
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responding to the questions and criticism raised in the reviewing
process. 14
Judicial review of the final environmental impact statement assures the integrity of the process. The courts have been quite strict
with federal agencies, invalidating agency proposals for failure to
prepare a statement, 15 for failure to consider impacts in sufficient
detail, 16 for improperly segmenting a project, 17 and for failure to
consider alternatives in an adequate•fashion. 18 Environmentalists
have effectively used litigation to assure agency compliance with
the procedural requirements of NEPA.
Despite the expenditure of substantial agency resources both in
statement preparation and in litigation, it is not clear that environmental impact statements have caused agency decision-making to
be more responsive to environmental concerns. 19 Commentators
have noted that the environmental impact statement has not stimulated inquiry into possible alternatives, but has been offered as a
post hoc justification for the agency's decision. 20 Rather than rendering the federal decision-making process more responsive, the
environmental impact statement requirement has consumed considerable agency resources and has often caused environmentalists
to expend their resources focusing on the procedure of statement
preparation rather than on the substantive decision. 21

1

40 C.F.R. § 1500.10 (1975).
Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973); Green County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
16
Ecology Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Prince George's
County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975).
17
The problem of improper segmentation seems to be endemic to highway programs. See,
e.g., Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Fugate,
347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
18
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see generally
Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: What "Alternatives" Must an
Agency Discuss?, 12 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 221 (1976).
19
Andrews, Agency Response to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications, 16 NAT. RES.
J. 301 (1976); Cramton & Berg, On Leading A Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal
Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511 (1973); Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics,
and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. RES. J. 339 (1976); Jordan,
Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an Accommodation, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705 (1973); Sax,
The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973); Strohbehn, NEPA's
Impact on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples of Noncompliance and Suggestions for
Change, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 93 (1974); Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact
Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REv. 545 (1975);
Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Levei Decisionmaking, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1973).
20
Jordan, supra note 19, at 724; Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, S AKRON L. REV. 545, 558 (1975).
21
Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement: An Essay on the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (unpublished manuscript).
1

•

•
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Despite criticism of the effectiveness of the environmental impact statement process, legislators have increasingly turned to the
impact statement as a method to limit the discretion exercised by
administrative agencies. While there have been recent federal innovations,22 the most notable expansion of the concept has come
at the state level. Several states have considered, and a few states
have passed, proposals which would require economic impact
statement (EclS) preparation prior to certain types of legislative
and administrative actions. 23

22
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-140, § I, 89 Stat. 751 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 136d (1970)) (requires the EPA, prior to the
cancellation of a registration of a pesticide, to consider the impact of that action upon the
agricultural economy); Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2, 88
Stat. 1706 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970)) (requires a competitive impact statement to be
filed along with a proposed consent decree in a civil antitrust proceeding); Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(d), 88
Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U .S.C. § 57a (Supp. V 1975)) (requires the FTC t_o prepare, prior to
promulgation, an economic assessment of the effect of a rule defining unfair or deceptive
acts or practices); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §
204, 90 Stat. 2743 (to be codified in 43 U .S.C. § 1714) (requires a statement as to the
economic impact of a withdrawal of public land); S. 4260, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG.
REc. 22253 (1974) (requires preparation of a competitive impact statement for proposed
legislation and major Federal actions significantly affecting competition in certain designated industries); Exec. Order No. I 1,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (1974) (required legislation
and proposed rules to be accompanied by a certificate stating that the inflationary impact of
the proposal has been evaluated).
23
The following proposals for an analysis of the economic impact of various actions have
been enacted: California Ass. Con. Res. 133, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1976) (legislative analyst to
prepare a statement evaluating the effect of a pending bill on employment), and Ass. Con.
Res. 211, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. ( 1976) (legislative analyst to prepare a statement analyzing the
cost to citizens of pending bills); The Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975, ch.
76-1, 1976 Fla. Laws I (requiring an economic impact statement to be prepared prior to
agency action, see Part II infra), repealed by Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla.
Laws 750 (limited the preparation of economic impact statements to agency rules); Act of
September 5, 1975, Pub. A. 79-790, 1975 Ill. Laws 2455 (amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
111-½, § 1006 (1973)) (requires an economic impact statement to be prepared for certain
existing and proposed rules and regulations of the Pollution Control Board); Act of May 23,
1975, ch. 688, § 4, 1975 Nev. Stats. 1387 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. § 218.2725 (1973))
(requires the preparation of a fiscal note for bills having a financial impact on a local
government); Act of March 28, 1975, ch. 15, 1975 S.D. Sess. Laws 40 (codified in S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 1-26-4.2 (1976 Supp.)) (requires a fiscal note stating the effect of a
proposed rule on the revenues, expenditures, or fiscal liability of the state or its subdivisions); Act of March 24, 1976, ch. 117, 1975-76 2d Ex. Sess. Wash. Laws 414 (requires state
and local governmental entities with rule-making authority to adopt procedures to insure
that economic values are given appropriate consideration).
The following proposals to require various types of economic analysis were considered:
Indiana S.B. 414, 99th Cen. Ass. (1976) (would require the legislative council to develop
criteria for determining which legislative proposals shall be subject to the preparation of
impact statements detailing the cost to citizens of the proposed action); Michigan H.B. 6423,
78 Legis., Reg. Sess. (1976) (discussed in detail in Part II infra); Michigan S.B. 1008 and
S.B. 1074, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1976) (would require an economic impact statement for
proposed legislation and administrative rules); New York A.B. 9343, 199th Sess. (1976)
(would require an EcIS for proposed agency rules and regulations); Pennsylvania S.B. 1248,
Session of 1975 (would mandate a study of the costs and benefits of environmental protection and pollution control statutes); Pennsylvania H.B. 1557, Session of 1975 (would require
an EcIS to be prepared for proposed bills and regulations dealing with environmental
protection o_r pollution control); Pennsylvania H.B. 2052, Session of 1976 (would create a
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This note examines Florida H.B. 874, 24 which was passed by the
state legislature and repealed shortly thereafter, and Michigan
H.B. 6423, 25 which was considered by the Michigan legislature in
1976. 26 Both bills are entitled the Economic Impact Disclosure Act
and, except for a few provisions, they are identical. 27 These bills
would apply. to more types of administrative agency activity and
would require more factors to be considered in the assessment of
economic impact than do existing statutes or other proposed bills.
Thus, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act is a particularly useful
vehicle for examining the virtues and faults of legislation mandating a formal procedure for economic analysis within the agency
decision-making process.

II.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT DISCLOSURE ACT

A. General Provisions
The Act expands and formalizes the procedure by which administrative agencies assess the probable economic effects of their
actions. Although most agencies currently analyze the economic
effect of proposed actions, 28 the bills would standardize the procedure for all state agencies. The basic statutory command is that
"Every agency, in advance of agency action, shall justify its proposed action by preparing an economic impact statement using
professionally accepted· methodology, with quantification of data
to the extent possible giving effect to both short- and long-term
consequences. " 29
1. Scope-Two definitions reveal the breadth of the statutory
requirement of EcIS preparation. •~ Agency" is defined to include
state departments, boards, commissions, and any other agency in,
Joint Legislative Committe~ on Regulatory Reform to conduct an economic analysis of state
economic regulatory activity). Copies of these bills are on file with the UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM.
See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATIVE
REPORT, July 15, 1976.
24
The Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975, ch. 76-1, 1976 Fla. Laws I
(repealed by Act of June 28. 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 750) [hereinafter cited as
Florida H.B. 874. ch. 76-1, 1976 Fla. Laws I].
25
Michigan H.B. 6423. 78th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Michigan.H.B.
6423 (1976)].
26
The legislative history of the two bills- is discussed in Part II B infra.
27
These bills are hereinafter referred to as the Economic Impact Disclosure Act except
when there is a reference to a specific bill.
28
STAFF OF THE MICHIGAN HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF
MICHIGAN H.B. 6423, (June 21, 1976) [hereinafter cited as APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS]; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYSIS OF H.B.
6423 (July 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN DMB ANALYSIS].
29
Florida H.B. ~4. ch. 76-1, § 4(1), 1976 Ela. Laws 2; Michigan H.B. 6423, § 3(1)(1976).
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state government. 3° Furthermore, the Michigan version requires
local governmental subdivisions to prepare an EcIS unless the
action taken is "specifically authorized by a local elected board or
official. " 31 Under these provisions all state agencies involved in
significant regulatory activities would be required to file an EcIS in
appropriate circumstances.
The definition of the agency activities which trigger the EclS is
crucial to the ultimate success of the procedure. An overly broad
definition will produce a flood of statements, preventing agency
decision-makers and interested parties from focusing on those situations in which economic analysis might point out deficiencies in
the contemplated activities. In addition, preparation of the statement could become a mere pro forma exercise generating considerable paperwork with little potential for insightful analysis. A
narrow definition which excludes important and significant agency
activity from the economic analysis requirement should also be
avoided.
The drafters of Florida H.B. 874 chose to exclude very little from
their definition of agency action.
"Agency action" means any action by an agency or subdivison thereof which may have substantial economic impact upon
any person. Substantial economic impact may occur through a
related series of agency decisions which individually may not
have substantial economic impact, but which cumulatively have
substantial impact. Agency action includes, but is not limited
to, all rules, ... policy statements, agency bulletins, and internal agency procedures and other agency decisions which
may have substantial economic impact. 32

There are few activities of state agencies which are not included
in such a broad definition. Implementation of the bill would likely
produce a virtual flood of impact statements.
The drafters of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act implicitly
recognized the delay that will be caused by preparation of the EcIS
and the need for state agencies to act promptly in certain circumstances, even if some information is not available. As a result,
certain agency actions are not made subject to the requirements of

3

° Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 3(1), 1976 Fla. Laws 1; Michigan H.B. 6423, § 2(1)(1976).

31

Michigan H.B. 6423, § 2(b) (1976).
Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 3(2), 1976 Fla. Laws l:The Michigan version, H.B. 6423,
does not include an enumeration of the various types of agency activity that fall within the
definition of agency action. Arguably, the definition of agency action will not be as broad as
in Florida H.B. 874. However, since local government agencies are covered by the Michigan
bill, the total number of statements filed may still be at least as great in Florida.
32
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the Act. 33 Chief among these exclusions are legislative actions, 34
emergency rules or purchases, and "ministerial" activities. 35
2. Content-The Act lists certain information· which must be
included in the economic impact statement.
(a) A description of the action proposed, the purpose for taking
the action, the legal authority for the action, and the plan for
implementing the action.
(b) A determination thaMhe action is the least cost method for
achieving the stated purpose.

33

Florida exempted the following agency actions from the coverage of the Act:
(I) The collection and payment of social security funds, retirement funds, or
employee benefit funds.
(2) Participation in any federal program, if under federal law the participation
would be prevented by compliance with this act.
(3) All emergency rules, or emergency purchases, ... ; provided however, within
a reasonable period of time after the action, an appropriate economic impact
statement shall be prepared.
(4) All legislative actions ....
(5) All purchases by any state agency which have a fair market or monetary value
which is less than $50,000.
(6) Ministerial action by an agency which complies with applicable statutes and
rules.
(7) Action by a state agency which is required by law to be maintained as·
confidential.
(8) The preparation and sale of all bonds ... .
(9) Expenditures of money from trust funds ... .
(10) Judicial actions by the judicial branch of government, and by the Industrial
Relations Commission.
(11) Judicial or quasi-judicial functions of [several other state agencies].
(12) Action taken by the State Board of Administration.
(13) The prosecution of civil, criminal or administrative actions before any court
or before an administrative hearing officer.
(14) Actions involving persons in the custody of the state ....
Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 7, 1976 Fla. Laws 2-3.
34 Even though legislative actions are excluded from the coverage of the Act, a member of
the Florida legislature may request that an agency prepare an economic impact statement on
any proposed legislation which has a direct relationship to the agency. Florida H.B. 874, ch.
76- I, § 6, 1976 Fla. Laws 2. The exclusion of legislative activity is somewhat puzzling given
the greater potential of legislation to affect significantly economic activity. See note 51 infra.
Certain states have provided a limited form of economic analysis for proposed legislation,
known as a fiscal note. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 13.10 (I 973). Fiscal notes are limited to a
prediction of the effect of the proposed legislation on the expenditures or revenues of state
or local governments. Thus, fiscal notes are much less comprehensive than economic impact
statements.
35
The exclusion of ministerial activities from the requirements of the Act could be a
potent source of confusion. Distinguishing between ministerial and discretionary administrative acts is also crucial in determining whether mandamus will lie to compel an official to
perform a duty imposed by law. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 151-60 (6th ed. 1974). This distinction has caused the courts a great
deal of trouble in the mandamus setting and its importation into the scope of economic
impact statements is unwise. Professor Jaffe has concluded:
The notion that each administrative act can be classified a priori either as
"ministerial" or "discretionary" is unsound and unworkable. If the mandamus
cases in any one state are studied as a body, it will be found impossible to reconcile
the decisions simply by assigning each to one or the other class. The classification
is illusory; it is apt to label the result rather than explain it.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF_ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965).
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(c) A comparison of the cost benefit relation of the action to
nonaction.
(d) A determination that the action represents the most efficient
use of public and private resources.
(e) A determination of the effect of action on competition.
(t) A conclusion as to the economic impact of the proposed
agency action on preserving an open market for employment.
(g) A conclusion as to the economic impact upon all persons
substantially affected by the action, including an analysis containing a description as to which persons will bear the costs of
the action and which persons will benefit directly and indirectly
from the action. 36

The agency will exercise considerable discretion in predicting
these various impacts. The admonition to use professionally accepted methodology 37 does not significantly restrict this discretion
as there are no standards yet developed against which to compare
the techniques used by the agency. To be meaningful the EcIS
should include an explanation of the technique used to measure
and balance impacts in addition to a prediction of those impacts. 38
The requirement that the agency determine that the action is the
least cost method of achieving the stated purpose could be a
significant limitation upon agency discretion. Narrowly construed,
it would mandate that economic efficiency, defined _in terms of
government expenditures, is the overriding consideration in agency
decision-making. 39 This approach differs considerably from the
existing_procedure in which the agency is allowed to consider other
noneconomic factors in arriving at its decision. 40

Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 4, 1976 Fla. Laws i; Michigan H.B. 6423, § 3 (1976).
See text accompanying note 29 supra.
38
See Part III infra.
39
The title of "Economic Impact Disclosure Act" is somewhat misleading. The Act goes
beyond disclosure of predicted economic impacts to require that the agency choose the most
efficient alternative to achieve the stated purpose. Governor Askew, in his letter vetoing
Florida H.B. 874, stated:
[Tihe language of the bill that an economic impact statement must contain a
determination that the agency action is the least-cost method of achieving a stated
purpose may be interpreted as limiting the options open to the agency. A narrow
view of the "costs" of a course of action would preclude consideration of nonmonetary impacts and not serve the public interest.
Letter from Governor Reubin Askew to Secretary of State Bruce A. Smathers (June 27,
1975) (vetoing H.B 874) [hereinafter cited as VETO MESSAGE] (on file with the UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM].
There is a potential conflict between a narrowly construed "least cost" requirement and
the requirement that the action be the most efficient use of resources. Quite conceivably, an
increased expenditure could result in a more efficient use of resources, as measured by a
cost-benefit ratio or some other formula. In some situations the two requirements may be
incompatible.
0
•
A more traditional concern has been that the agency weighs economic factors too
heavily at the expense of other values which are not as easily quantified. See remarks of
Senator Jackson, note 79 infra; Stewart, supra note 3, at 1704.
36
37
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3. Public and Judicial Review-In addition, the Act provides a
mechanism for public participation in the activities of state agencies. The Michigan version, H.B. 6423, requires that economic
impact statements be filed in the office of the county clerk, and that
the statements be made available to the public. 41 Judicial review
over agency implementation of the Act may be obtained by any
"aggrieved person." 42 Courts are given a significant oversight
function over agency preparation of the statements.
The court ... may review ... the timeliness of the filing of
the economic impact statement and the adequacy of the statement to determine whether or not the statement was prepared in
accordance with [the requirements of the Act].
The acting agency shall not be accorded a presumption of
expertise and a person challenging the action shall have the
burden of proving the case only by a preponderance of the
evidence. 43

The likelihood that litigation will be a principal method of ensuring
agency compliance has been enhanced by provisions giving the
court discretion to award costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party. 44 Under the Florida version, the EcIS was to be part of the
record for judicial review under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. 45
Michigan H.B. 6423, § 3(3) (1976).
Id. § 7(1). The question of identifying an "aggrieved person", that is, one who will have
standing to seek judicial review of the agency preparation of the Eels· is similar to that
arising under state"and federal Administrative Procedure Acts. The Michigan law provides,
"When a person ... is aggrieved by a final decision or order ... the decision or order is
subject to direct review, by the courts as provided by law." MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 24.301
(1970). The federal Administrative Procedure Act states: "A person ... adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The businesses directly regulated by state agencies
will be able to show economic "irijury in fact" and should have no problem with standing.
More difficult problems may arise with respect to consumers and consumer groups. In
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the
Court laid down two criteria a party must satisfy in order to obtain judicial review of an
agency action under the A.P.A. The plaintiff must allege injury in fact and the interest
asserted must arguably be within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the relevant
statute. Id. at 152-53. Consumers or consumer groups should be able to assert that their
interest in the effective administration of state regulatory agencies is within the zone of
interests protected by the Economic Impact Disclosure Act. See Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the court stated:
"Consumers of regulated products and services have standing to protect the public interest
in the proper administration of a regulatory system enacted for their benefit." Consumers
also should be able to establish an injury in fact given the willingness of the courts to follow
an "attenuated line of causation" flowing from the agency action to the consumer. See
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S. 669, 688
(1973).
43
Michigan H.B. 6423, § 7 (1976).
44
Id. § 7(4).
45
FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50 - .73 (1973). Florida H.B. 874 originally had a section dealing
specifically with judicial review, but it was deleted by floor amendments. The final version
merely requires the EclS to accompany proposed rules filed under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 2.
41

42
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B. Legislative History
Florida H.B. 874 was passed by the legislature in 1975, but was
vetoed by Governor Askew. While stating that he supported the
basic concept behind the bill, 46 the Governor voiced objection to
numerous aspects of the bill and revealed his fear that "a potential
exists for the requirement to be used as a tool to stymie the proper
operation of government. " 47 The legislature overrode his veto on
April 8, 1976, and as a result, the Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975 was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1976. 48
The discussion spurred by the veto and override led to the repeal
of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act before it became effective. 49 It was feared that the scope of agency activity covered by
the Act was too broad and that the day-to-day activities of the
government would be severely curtailed. 50 The same bill also
amended the Florida Administrative Procedure Act to require an
economic impact statement for.administrative rules, 51 but internal
agency procedures, agency bulletins and other agency activities
are no longer subject to the requirement. The EcIS is part of the
record which is reviewed by the Administrative Procedure Committee of the legislature before the rule is promulgated. 52
Michigan's version of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act was
never passed by its legislature. The Michigan House of Representatives passed H.B. 6423, unanimously and without amendment,
within three weeks of its introduction. 53 The Michigan Senate State
Affairs· Committee held public hearings, 54 studied the issues involved more carefully, and never reported the bill out of committee.
46
Governor Askew stated: "I completely support the basic concept behind the bill. The
executive branch of government, as- well as the legislature, should be cognizant of the
economic impact of its actions and should be able to justify those actions in view of the
impact." VETO MESSAGE, supra note 39.
41 Id.
48
Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § 9, 1976 Fla. Laws 3.
49
Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, § 5, 1976 Fla. Laws 750 (Florida S.B. 949 (1976)).
50
VETO MESSAGE, supra note 39. See Letter from Governor Askew to Robert L. Bartley,
Editor of the Wall Street Journal (May JO, 1976) (responding to an editorial of May 5, 1976,
critical of the Governor's veto).
51
FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1973) was amended to require that, prior to the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of any rule, the agency must prepare an economic impact statement
and include a summary of the estimated economic impact in its notice of intended action. In
addition, the legislature is required to consider the economic impact that proposed legislation will have upon the public and affected agencies. However, no law can be declared
invalid for failure of the legislature to comply with the requirement. Act of June 28, 1976, ch.
76-276, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 752.
52
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10)(a) (1973), as amended by Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 76-276, §§
1-2, 1976 Fla. Laws 751-752.
53 Michigan House Journal, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess., 2177, June 22, 1976.
54
See Michigan Senate Journal, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess., 1826, September 13, 1976. The
author is indebted to the Michigan Senate State Affairs Committee staff which provided
background material and analyses of Michigan H.B. 6423.
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C. Purposes

The Economic Impact Disclosure Act seeks to remedy the failure of state agencies to consider adequately the economic impact
which contemplated actions have on individuals and the business
community. 55 From a broader perspective, however, the Act may
be viewed as another legislative attempt to limit the discretionary
power of state agencies through procedures altering and constricting the decision-making process. The Act is thus designed to ensure the responsiveness of agency activity to the public interest
and to the legislative intent embodied in the applicable statute. 56
The framers of the Act attempted to achieve this purpose by full
investigation and disclosure of the economic consequences of
agency actions. In addition, the agency's discretion is curbed by
requiring that the agency action be the one most justified, determined by reference to economic criteria. The availability of
economic information is designed to prevent unintended and unforeseen economic costs to consumers and the business community. Public participation and judicial review are designed to improve agency decison-making by preventing actions based upon
obviously biased agency evaluations and by allowing close scrutiny
of the justifications offered for agency actions. 57
In theory, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act has the potential
to generate significant cost savings for the state. The requirements
that a cost-benefit analysis be made and that the agency determine,
and presumably select, the least cost alternative c;ertainly evidence
a legislative intent to promote efficient use of government resources through statement preparation as well as to promote
agency responsiveness. In the long run, the EcIS could be a significant tool in coordinating the activities and planning among state
agencies and with the legislature. 58
The findings and intent section of Florida H.B. 874 (1976) is illustrative.
The Legislature finds that a state agency should not regulate or restrict the
freedom of any person to conduct his affairs, use his property or deal with others
on mutually agreeable terms unless it finds, after full consideration of the effect of
agency action, that the action would benefit the public interest and encourage the
benefits of a free enterprise system for the citizens of Florida .... The Legislature
further recognizes that agency action taken without evaluation of its economic
impact may have unintended effects which may include barriers to competition,
reduced economic efficiency, unjustified transfers of value from one person to
another, reduced consumer choice, increased producer and consumer costs and
restrictions on employment. Accordingly it is the continuing responsibility of
agencies to analyze the economic impact of agency actions and reevaluate the
economic impact of agency actions to determine that the actions promote ··the
public interest.
Florida H.B. 874, ch. 76-1, § I, 1976 Fla. Laws I.
56
See APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, supra note 28.
57
See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1674-76.
58 MICHIGAN DMB ANALYSIS, supra note 51. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6423 (July 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
55
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Underlying these justifications is a perception of the decisionmaking process as a basically rational system susceptible to improvement by requiring the decision-maker to gather and evaluate
more information. This approach views the agency decisionmakers as value-free 59 administrators choosing the proper alternative from among the various possible means of solving a problem or
achieving some clearly defined goal. An EcIS would further
rationalize the process by providing more information for the
decision-maker and by affording public disclosure to aid interested
parties in challenging agency action. These two assumptions, that a
"correct" decision or alternative exists, and that a rational valuefree process will help the agency reach that decision, are examined
in Part III, but it should be noted that the purposes and procedures
of the bill implicitly rest on a model of decision-making that is
widely disputed. 60

D. Criticisms
Despite its purpose of increasing the responsiveness of state
agencies, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act would further slow
the already cumbersome processes of govemment. 61 An initial
delay for statement preparation would be necessary if the
economic impact .statements are to provide relevant information.
This delay may be appropriate for those decisions which have
significant long-run social and economic consequences which are
not clearly understood. But the scope of the Economic Impact
Disclosure Act ex tends far beyond these decisions into the daily
activities of state agencies. 62 Agency responsiveness is not increased by a procedure, applicable to all state agencies, which
indiscriminately mandates a formal procedure for such a wide
range of. agency activities. 63
SERVICES ANALYSIS]; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6423
(Aug. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE ANALYSIS].
"" Agency decision-makers should seek to further the values of the legislature rather than
their personal value preferences or those of some other group which is not politically
responsive. As some observers have stated: "Agencies would be said to fail when they
reach substantive policy decisons (including decisions not to act) that do not coincide with
what the politically accountable branches of government would have done if they had
possessed the time, the information, and the will to make such decisions." Cutler &
Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1399 (1975).
60
See Part IV infra.
61
See note 105 and accompanying text infra.
62
This criticism is particularly applicable to Florida H.B. 874. See VETO MESSAGE, supra
note 39; Part II A.supra.
63
As the Ash Council Report stated," Accountability and fairness, however, include not
only arriving at a correct disposition, but its timely implementation, Indeed, where the effort
is to respond to dynamic economic and social problems, the timing of the response often is
of critical significance." THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE REORGAN 1ZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 53 (1971).
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For an uncertain time after the effective date of the Act, the
probability of delay will be particularly great since agencies cur~
rently lack the expertise necessary to prepare an adequate
economic impact statement. 64 The expansive judicial review
granted by the Act will enable parties aggrieved by agency action
io obtain injunctive or other relief at least until the agencies deve_lop the expertise neces~ary to withstand close judicial
sc:rutiny .65 The delay caused by statement preparation will be
further exacerbated by judicial review of the statement.
It is not clear, however, that expansive powers of judicial review
would effectively ensure agency compliance with the goals of the
Act. The courts are not equipped to decide whether the agency is
using the most accurate or reliable economic techniques in its
measurements of the yarious factors. 66 Thus, an examination of an
agency's economic predictions is not an effective method of checking unwanted agency activity, especially when the court would
retain its traditional powers to halt agency activity that violates
constitutional, statutory, or procedural dictates. 67 Because of the
potential for delay, the expansion of judicial review to include an
examination of the adequacy of the economic impact statement is
not warranted.
State agencies will incur_ significant additional costs if they are
required to produce detailed economic analyses. Additional staff

64
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, supra note 28; MICHIGAN DMB ANALYSIS,
supra note 28; DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES ANALYSIS, supra note 58.
65
The Michigan Department of Civil Service was particularly sensitive to the problem of
litigaVon disrupting agency activities.
Development of adequate procedures and practices by which agencies become
capable of fulfilling the requirements of this bill may take two to five years,
according to experts in the field of management. It hardly seems advisable to
expose government agencies to potential court suits on a process which may be in
developmental stages for the next two to five years.
MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE ANALYSIS, supra note 59.
66
See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972), in which the Court
stated, "[C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems." See also
Stewart, supra note 3, ·at 1710-1 I.
67
The Michigan Administrative Procedure Act provides an example of the scope of
judicial review.
(I) Except when a statute or the constitution provides for a different scope of
review, the court shall hold unlawful and set aside a decision or order of an agency
if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the decision or
order is any of the following:
.
(a) In violation of the constitution or a statute.
· (b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency.
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure resulting in material prejudice to an agency.
(d) Not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole
record.
(e) Arbitrary, .capricious or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion.
(f) Affected by other substantial and material errors of law.
MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 24.306 (197.0).
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would be required to prepare the EcIS's 68 and additional legal
expenses could be expected as a result of the increased litigation.
The delays and increased costs would be justified if increased
efficiency and more responsive agency decisions resulted. The
expectation of efficiency and responsiveness must be evaluated in
terms of the utility of this type of economic analysis in limiting the
discretionary powers of state agencies and its role in the agency
decision-making process.

III.

THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The Economic Impact Disclosure Act is an attempt to structure
administrative decisions through economic techniques. 69 Through
resort to supposedly unbiased economic data, administrative agencies are to arrive at the preferable regulatory decision, thereby
avoiding claims that the agency has abused its discretion. One
commentator has observed that use of economic techniques is to
"hold out a generalized method of reaching unique or nondiscretionary policy solutions which merit acceptance because
they are the result of technical or value free procedures of social
choice . " 70
Economic analysis gives "the appearance of value-free rationality
at work." 71 By isolating the crucial economic variables and applying scientific methodology to measure the effect of alternate actions, the decision-maker is presented with a quantified evaluation
of the relative desirability of each choice. The requirement that the
decision-maker pick the alternative which the economic analysis
shows to be the most justified is designed to eliminate discretion
from the decision. Such an approach ignores the analyst's discretion in selecting and measuring the probable impacts of alternatives
and also the importance of noneconomic, nonquantifiable values
to the decision-maker and to the larger society.
The analyst who prepares an EcIS operates with tremendous
68 The Michigan Department of Public Health estimated that Department expenditures for
statement preparation would be $234,967 yearly. It estimated that seven program analysts
and seven support personnel would be required. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6423 (June 21, 1976).
69 See Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations of Legal
Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of
Vacation Home Development, 1976 WISC. L. REV. 385, 386, where the author states that
"the use of economic techniques to structure legal decisions has been the most important
development in recent jurisprudential theory .... It is against the inadequacy of traditional
doctrine to satisfactorily resolve innovative problems that the emergence of legal economics
must be understood."
70 Id. at 387.
71 Kramer, Policy Analysis as Ideology, 35 Pue. Ao. REY. 509, 509 (1975).
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leeway. Although the variables for consideration are outlined and
the Act requires "professionally accepted methodology, " 72 the
analyst will exercise discretionary judgment in defining the variables, in predicting the long-term effects of a policy choice, and in
the selection of alternatives to be considered. In addition, the
results of a "scientific" economic analysis will reflect the ideology
of the analyst. 73 His ideological perspective will undoubtedly lead
the analyst to inquire into certain effects, to ignore others, and to
alter the weights accorded to various factors. 74 In particular, three
categories of interests or values are likely to be accorded insufficient weight by policy analysts: those too widely diffused to be
strongly advocated by any interested party; those associated with
future generations; and those not associated with human factors. 75
The conclusion drawn from the economic analysis will be shaped
by the perspective of the analyst. This, even supposedly valuefree economic analysis involves significant administrative discretion in its preparation.
Other shortcomings of economic analysis also prevent nondiscretionary, objective admin.istrative decisions. To rank alternatives involves an assumption about society's preferences for goods
and services. 76 Otherwise, the relative desirability of each alternative cannot be ascertained. The problem arises in determining
which set of preferences should be used. To use a set of existing
preferences ignores both the tremendous impact of government
policies on future preferences 77 and the desirability of altering
present preferences to achieve long-term goals. To rank alternatives according to the analyst's conception of which preferences
should be encouraged and which should be ignored destroys any
semblance of objectivity, but the heart of government policymaking is to make precisely such choices.
Economic analysis cannot provide a "correct" solution to the
regulatory problems which confront an administrative agency. Because the ideologies of policy analysts differ, respectable economic
justifications can be advanced for a number of different alternatives. Even without the influence of ideology, the information

72
73

See text accompanying note 29 supra.
In this context, "ideology" refers to a belief or value system consisting of attitudes
toward the various societal institutions and processes. It provides a picture of the world by
organizing its complexity into a reasonably simple and understandable framework. See L.
SARGENT, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES I (1972).
74
Kramer, supra note 71, at 509.
75
Tribe. Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PHIL. & Pue. AFF. 66, 104 (1972).
76
This criticism of economic analysis is more fully developed in Stewart, supra note 3, at
1704-06. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text infra.
77
Federal housing and transportation policies since World War II have had a tremendous
impact upon present preferences and lifestyles. See id., at 1706 n.179.
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necessary to resolve questions concerning optimal economic efficiency may be impossible or prohibitively expensive to obtain. 78
The information presented to the decison-maker by economic
analysis does not reveal a clearly superior choice. Indeed,
economic efficiency is not and should not be the sole criterion.
Nonquantifiable values play an equally important role and may
override economic ones. Where these values are important considerations they should be disclosed and made subject to public inspection. Economic analysis is no substitute for the normative and.
political considerations which motivate decison-makers. Placing
economic impact in a preeminent position obscures the identity
and importance of these nonquantifiable criteria. If the decisionmaker is required to offer an economic impact statement to justify
his decision, there is sufficient leeway in statement preparation to
enable him to do so.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING

The Economic Impact Disclosure Act attempts to place detailed
information at the disposal of the decison-maker so that he will be
able to arrive at the optimal solution to a perceived problem. Like
NEPA, 79 the Act is an attempt to render the decision-making
78 For an example of the complexities and problems associated with applying sophisticated economic techniques to determine the optimal number of vacation homes, see Heller,
supra note ff), at 395-438.
79
NEPA attempts to rationalize the agency decision-making process by requiring a
comprehensive plan of environmental management. Senator Henry M. Jackson, the sponsor
of NEPA, explicitly rejected the incremental model of decision-making, discussed in Part IV
B infra, as an acceptable guide for agency decision-making.
Over the years, in small but steady and growing increments, we in America have
been making very important decisions concerning the management of our environment. Unfortunately, these haven't always been very wise decisions. Throughout
much of our history, the goal of managing the environment for the benefit of all
citizens has often been overshadowed and obscured by the pursuit of narrower and
more immediate economic goals.
It is only in the past few years that the dangers of this form of muddling through
events and establishing policy by inaction and default have been very widely
perceived ....
This report proposes that the American people, the Congress, and the administration break the shackles of incremental policy-making in the management of
natural resources.
115 CONG. REC. 29068-69 (1969). See D'Amato & Baxter, The Impact of Impact Statements
Upon Agency Responsibility: A Prescriptive Analysis, 59 IowA L. REv. 195, 198 n.6 (1973);
Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement: An Essay On the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (unpublished manuscript); Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts,
Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. REs. J. 339, 340 (1976);
Liroff, Administrative, Judicial and Natural Systems: Agency Response to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 LOY. CHI. L.J. 19, 25-33 (1972); Comment, The
National Environmental Policy Act Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 799, 808 n.42 (1973).
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process more responsive to considerations which the legislature
believes have been given insufficient weight. Attention must be
given to the decison-making in order to insure that the probable
effect of EcIS's on administrative decision-making will be to provide information that will impact on the process in a meaningful
manner.
A. The Rational Model

The traditional view of the decision-making process is a rational
system in which the relevant actor becomes aware of a problem,
weighs alternative solutions, and then chooses a solution based
upon his estimate of their respective merits. 80 The successful operation of the rational model imposes certain requirements. The
decision-maker must have detailed information about alternative
courses of action and their consequences. There must be a generr.ally accepted set of values to serve as a basis for the selection of
goals and to judge the desirability of various alternatives. The
decision-maker must calculate the desirability of each alternative
based upon its utility in furthering those values. Finally, the most
desirable policy alternative must be selected. 8 1. Thus, under the
rational model the decision-maker is clearly able to separate the
means and ends, facts and values, and can comprehensively survey
the alternatives to arrive eventually at the optimal solution to the
problem.
An economic impact statement is designed to operate within the
context of this rational model. The EclS provides the decisionmaker with detailed information on the predicted effect of an
action. The list of factors to be considered 82 is an attempt to define
the values which the government agency should promote. The
listing of alternatives should define the scope of the decisionmaker's inquiry. In theory, the EclS should quantify the merit of
each alternative, enabling the decision-maker to choose the alternative best suited to deal with the problem in light of the defined
values.
The rational model is not a sufficiently realistic description of
decision-making in administrative agencies. 83 The model ignores

80
The rational model of the decision-~aking process seems to be drawn from the concepts of economic man, the scientific method, and the ideal model of bureaucracy postulated
by Max Weber. See Pfiffner, Administrative Rationality, 20 Pue. Ao. REv. 125 (1960).
81
This description of a rational process of administrative decision-making is drawn from
Etzioni. Mixed Scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision-Making, 27 Pue. Ao. REv. 385,
385 (1967).
82
See text accompanying note 36 supra.
83
Dror, Muddling Through-"Science" or Inertia?, 24 Pue. Ao. REV. 153, 153 (1964).
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both the intellectual limitations of the decision-maker and the political context within which the agency functions. Decison-makers do
not attempt a comprehensive survey of all the possible alternatives. The cost of obtaining all of the relevant information and the
requisite analysis is too great. Moreover, the decision-maker has
only a limited amount of time to assimilate and to evaluate information before coming to a decision.
The assumption that an agency as a decision-maker has a clearly
defined set of values has also been disputed. 84 Within any organization there will be no shared set of clearly defined values or
agreement as to the means to effect any given value. 85 The values
upon which there is widespread agreement are likely to be too
vague to serve as a guide for decision-making. 86 Any attempt to
establish a guideline set of values ignores the fluidity of values and
their constant revision as societal value preferences change.
Since the decision-maker cannot assemble and evaluate detailed
information on alternatives and there is no common set of values to
provide a basis for ranking those alternatives, the rational model
cannot precisely describe the decision-making process of a large
organization such as a government agency. One commentator on
public administration has concluded, "A decision-maker, attempting to adhere to the tenets of a rationalistic model, will become
frustrated, exhaust his resources without coming to a decision, and
remain without an effective decision-making model to guide him.
Rationalistic models are thus rejected as being at once unrealistic
and undesirable. " 87
B. The Incremental Model

The theoretical shortcomings of the rational model are well
known and various alternate theories have been advanced to reconcile the limitations of the decision-maker with the desire for a
basically rational decision-making process. 88 An alternate approach, known as the incremental model of decision-making, has
been ~dvanced and refined by Professor Charles Lindblom. 89 Re-

84 C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 141 (1965) ("There seems to be no
feasible way [of] ascertaining preferences on all the policy decisions that must be taken in
government, or even on any substantial minority of them.").
85 Id. at 139-41.
86 C. LINDLBOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 17 (1968).
87 Etzioni, supra note 81, at 386.
88 See, e.g .. Y. DROR, PUBLIC POLICY REEXAMINED ·129-96 (1968); w. GORE, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING: A HEURISTIC MODEL ()964); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1965); Pfiffner, supra note 80.
89 The concept of incremental decision-making was introduced in Lindblom, The Science
of"Muddling Through", 19 Pue. Ao. REV. 79 (1959). The model was further developed and
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jecting the unrealistic assumptions of the rational model, he posits
a process which is far from rational, but which more accurately
describes the actual decision-making process. 90
Under the incrementalist approach, decision-makers do not attempt to reach the optimal response to a problem; rather, they
settle for those solutions which provide a relatively satisfactory
realization of their values. 91 The model posits the following process:92
·
(I) The decision-maker does not attempt a comprehensive sur-

vey and evaluation of alternatives, but rather limits his attention
to policies which differ incrementally from existing policies.
(2) Out of a concern for political feasibility, the decision-maker
considers only a restricted number of those incremental alternatives.
(3) For each alternative only a few of the important consequences are considered; other important consequences are disregarded.
(4) The problem facing the decision-maker is continually redefined as the ends and means are adjusted to make the problems
more manageable.
(5) Thus, no "correct" solution is found because a never-ending
series of attacks is made on a constantly redefined problem.
(6) The decision-making process is remedial, designed to alleviate existing social problems rather than to achieve future
goals.
·

The incremental model describes a process of decision-making
far less demanding and far more shortsighted than the rational
model. Since only incremental policy changes are considered, the
decision-maker requires far less information to make his decision.
Furthermore, since the objective of the decision-maker is neither
to solve a problem nor to find the "correct" solution, the
decision-maker can ignore some ~onsequences and refrain from
defining values since there will always be an opportunity for later
evaluation. The policy decision can be altered as unforeseen consequences become apparent, the value preferences of society or the
decision-maker change, or political shifts make an attractive alternative feasible. 93
refined in D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963). and C.
LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965).
0
° Frederickson. Public Administration in the 1970s: Developments and Directions, 36
PuB. AD. REv. 564, 569 (1976). While not fully accepting the incremental model, Frederickson states, "Quite clearly, the incremental ... view is the most empirically accurate
of the approaches to rationality." Id. at 569.
91
H. SIMON, supra note 88, at XXV.
92
The following summary is that of the author of this note. It is drawn from C.
LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 144-48 (1965).
93
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 124 (f963).
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The incremental model has also been criticized from both a
normative and descriptive standpoint. 94 Viewed in the context of a
pluralistic society, the model underrepresents the poor and politically unorganized whose value preferences are not fully represented by decision-makers. 95 The model also ignores the process
of achieving basic societal innovations since it focuses on shortterm changes with only limited variations from existing policies. 96
An economic impact statement has a much less important role
when viewed from the perspective of the incremental model of
decision-making. Rather than being limited to incremental policy
alternatives, the EclS is designed to force detailed consideration of
all possible alternatives. An EcIS is designed to illustrate the single
best solution to the problem, but the model suggests that
decision-makers do not solve problems but merely adopt shortterm, remedial steps that will be satisfactory to the agency and
· other interested actors. In addition, an economic impact statement
does not allow room for different alternatives to become acceptable as values change and political forces shift.
C. The Role of an Economic Impact Statement

in the Decision-Making Process

Apart from th_e definitional problems in Florida H.B. 874 and
Michigan H.B. 6423, and the potential for agency manipulation in
statement preparation, reliance on the EcIS to improve the agency
decision-making process appears misguided. Administrative agencies are not rational actors devising policies designed to achieve
social goals. Their decisions must be acceptable within the agency's political environment. 97 They will be responsive to those
groups who can influence their organizational well-being. A government agency seeks to maintain positive relationships with those
groups-the executive, legislators, other administrators, and interest groups-that form its constituency. 98 The agency will develop

94 See Dror, supra note 83; Etzioni. supra note 81; Heyde brand. Administration of Social
Change, 24 Pue. Ao. REV. 163 (1964); Jones, The Model as a Decision Maker's Dilemma,
24 Pue. Ao. REv. 158 (1964).
95
Etzioni, supra note 81, at 387.
96
Dror, supra note 83, at 155 states that, "[a]lthough Lindblom's thesis includes a
number of reservations, these are insufficient to alter its mam impact as an 1cteolog1ca1
reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces prevalent in all human organizations, administrative and policy making."
For an attempt to synthesize the rational and incremental models of decision-making, see
Etzioni, supra note 81, at 388-92.
97 Holden, "Imperialism" in Bureaucracy, 60 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 943 (1966).
98 Holden defines constituency to include "any group, body or interest to which the
administrative politician looks for aid or guidance, or which seeks to establish itself as so
important (in his judgment) that he '. had better' take _account of its preferences." Id. at 944.
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policies that are acceptable to those groups regardless of economic
predictions that indicate an alternate policy may be more desirable.
This analysis does not suggest that economic analysis is not
valuable or that agency decision-makers should not try to reach
rational solutions to the problems they face. But the type of
economic analysis required by the Economic Impact Disclosure
Act is not an effective method offurthering these goals. The cost of
statement preparation will be considerable and the potential for
delay is significant. The benefit to the decision-making process is
outweighed by these costs. Agency decisions will continue to be
responsive to the demands of the agency's consitituency .99 Those
decisions will be framed by the values advanced by members of the
constituency and the agency and the need to find a solution acceptable to both. 10 ° Consequently, the EcIS will probably function as a
tool to justify the agency's decision rather than as an integral part
of the planning process. 101
The concepts of economic analysis suggest that procedural
changes in the agency decision-making process cannot be justified
if the costs of the change outweigh the resulting benefits. The EcIS
required by the Economic Impact Disclosure Act cannot meet this

99
The environmental impact statement requirement of NEPA can be justified as providing a basis for exerting political pressures on federal agencies.
[l]f one evaluates EIS's in terms of the quality or even potential quality of the
science which is brought to bear on environmental policy issues, the evaluation is
discouraging. However, if one takes a more political perspective, NEPA seems to
have created a new complex political process which can be and has been used very
effectively to improve the social and environmental sensitivity of government
decision-makers.
Friesma & Culhane, Social Impact, Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement
Process, 16 NAT. RES. J. 339, 340 (1976).
NEPA created an avenue for environmental groups, previously unrepresented in inany
agencies, to exert effective political pressure on decision-makers. The same justification is
not available for the Economic Impact Disclosure Act. The economic effects of agency
action, unlike the environmental ones, are examined prior to the decision. See note 28 and
accompanying text supra. In addition, it is not clear that the Act would prqvide a method for
previously ignored parties to exert effective political pressure on the agency. The business
community has been the most forceful advocate of the Economic Impact Disclosure Act, yet
these businesses are already able to communicate their opinions on proposed actions to the .
agencies. There is no indiciation that the Act would change the relative distribution of
political power as NEPA has done. Professor Andrews has commented that:
The enactment of NEPA was an attempt to bring about administrative change by
changes in procedures, and it may yet prove to have achieved some enduring
success. However, such success should probably be attributed to the maintenance
of political forces that have been engendered by the Act and the prevalent r.:limate
of environmental and related values. not to the direct effect of NEPA procedures
on agency activities.
Andrews. supra note 19, at 322. Thus any attempt to force the agency to be more responsive
to the economic impact of its activities through procedures altering the decision-making
process will not be effective unless there is a political climate to reinforce the procedural
change.
100
Holden. supra note 97. at 944.
101
This is basically the same criticism that has been leveled at environmental impact
statements. See s9urces listed in notes 19-20 supra.
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test. It will not effectively limit the discretionary powers of state
agencies because economic analysis of this type reflects the ideology of the policy analyst. It will not increase the responsiveness of
state agencies to the public interest and legislative intent, but will
instead be manipulated to justify decisions which are based on
undisclosed factors.

V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Economic analysis can play a useful role in the decision-making
context and should be encouraged if its limitations are appreciated.
Proposed legislation and administrative rules should be examined
prior to implementation to the extent reasonably possible. There is,
however, no need for a formal mechanism of the type required by
the Economic Impact Disclosure Act. The EcIS has limited potential for alleviating problems caused by the vast discretionary powers of administrative agencies.
However, more modest goals could be furthered by a statement
from the agency outlining the expected effects of a proposed rule.
Such a statement could serve as a method of disclosure establishing that the agency considered economic factors in reaching its
decision. In -addition, it would give the legislature and public an
opportunity to ascertain agency bias in the measurement and
weighing of values. These disclosures can be made by a much less
elaborate and less costly procedure than the one required by the
Economic Impact Disclosure Act.
An example of a procedure providing for disclosure of anticipated economic impact is found in the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. 102
When promulgating a rule defining unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, the FTC must issue a statement of basis and purpose. 103
The Commission's statement of basis and purpose to accompany a rule promulgated ... shall include (A) a statement as to
the prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule; (B) a
statement as to the manner and context in which such acts or
practices are unfair or deceptive; and (C) a statement as to the
economic effect of the rule, taking into account the effect on
small business and consumers .104

102
103
10

•

Pub. L. No. 637. 88 Stat. 2183 (1974).
15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975).

SPRING

1977]

Economic Impact Disclosure Act

5.89

Congres.s was aware of the limitations of economic analysis and
the costs borne by interested parties when agency rulemaking is
delayed. The House Report states:
The Committee wishes to emphasize that the requirements
for the FTC's statement which accompanies the adoption of a
rule are incorporated for the purpose of permitting a better
understanding of the terms o(the rule and the reasons for the
rule on the part of the public .... In particular, the requirement that the statement include statements as to the economic
impact of the rule does not require the Commission to undertake a full scale economic investigation prior to promulgation of
the rule. To do this would inordinately delay FTC proceedings
and deny relief to the consuming public while indefinite questions of economic prediction were resolved by the Commission.
This provision should be read to require that the Commission
consider the economic impacts of the rule to issues and summarize its best estimate of that impact in the statement. Obviously, a full evaluation of the economic impact of the rule would
have to await its promulgation. 105

The prospect of delay caused by the requirement of a statement
of economic effect is further reduced by the provisions for judicial
review. The statement of basis and purpose is part of the "rule making record" 106 which the courts review in deciding whether there is
substantial evidence to support the FfC action. However, the
"contents and adequacy" of the statement are not "subject to
judicial review in any respect." 107 Thus, the statement can aid in
justifying the.FTC's decision, but it presumably cannot undermine
that decision.
The economic analysis required by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the statement of economic effect which must accom105
H.R. REP. No. I 107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7702, 7729.
106
15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
107
15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(5)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
An alternate method of denying judicial review is illustrated by a case arising under Exec.
Order No. 11821, supra note 22, which requires an evaluation of the inflationary impact of
all major legislative proposals, rules, and regulations emanating from the executive branch
of the federal government. The Department of Agriculture promulgated regulations revising
USDA standards for the grades of carcass beef and slaughter cattle. 7 C. F.R. §§ 53.102,
53.104-.105. 53.203-.206 (1975). The Independent Meat Packers Association challenged
these regulations. alleging, inter alia, that the regulations were issued in viplation of Exec.
Order No. I 1821. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz. 514 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir.
1975) (per curiam). The District Court subsequently granted a permanent injunction finding
that there was "material and substantial noncompliance with the mandate of Executive
Order No. 11821." 395 F. Supp. 923, 932 (D. Neb. 1975). The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Exec. Order No. 11821 '"was intended primarily as a
managerial tool for implementing the President's personal economic policies and not as a
legal framework enforceable by private civil action." 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
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pany a rule promulgated pursuant to that Act are not similar to
those involved in the environmental impact statement process.
There is no public comment on the statement as it is being prepared
and there is no judicial review of the adequacy of the completed
statement. To prevent confusion between the different procedures,
the economic analysis required by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act should be labeled as an economic assessment rather than as an
economic impact statement.
This method of economic assessment, disclosing the anticipated
economic impact of the agency action, is superior to the statement
required by the Economic Impact Disclosure Act in several respects. The agency actions which trigger formal economic analysis
are appropriate.ly quite limited. Rather than requiring all state
agencies to prepare a statement for a broad spectrum of their
activities, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies only to a
single agency and requires the statement for rulemaking in one
specific area. This approach offers several advantages. A limited
number of statements will be produced, rather than the flood of
EcIS's resulting from the broader proposal, and the legislature can
designate the particular types of agency activity in which economic
considerations deserve particular attention. Moreover, fewer
agency resources will be required for preparation of an assessment.
In addition, hopefully, the assessments will receive closer scrutiny
than would be the case with a broader requirement.
Denying judicial review of the content and adequacy of an
economic assessment is another advantage. The potential for delay
is too great to justify judicial review in light of the limited effect of
either economic assessment or impact statements upon the
decision-making process. The courts, even more than the FTC, are
not well equipped to handle "indefinite questions of economic
prediction." 108 The resources of the agencies and interested parties can be more efficiently allocated to examination of the substantive decisions and the justifications for the decisions and biases of
the decision-maker, rather than to preparation of a statement
which does not significantly affect the choice of an alternative and
which obscures some of the important factors influencing that
choice.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Economic Impact Disclosure Act is a response to the perceived failure of state agencies to consider adequately the
10 •

See text accompanying note 105 supra.
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economic effects of their activities upon consumers and the business community. The Act would force agencies to present an
economic analysis of the impact of their actions and would allow
aggrieved parties to seek judicial review of the EclS to protect the
integrity of the process. Thus, the Act is designed to reduce the
problems arising from the discretion of state agencies and to make
the decision-making process more responsive to the public interest.
However, the Economic Impact Disclosure Act is a poor way to
achieve those goals. The statute includes far too many agency
activities within its scope and could substantially delay agency
response to pressing problems. But beyond the definitional problems, economic impact statements would not be an effective
method of controlling agency discretion. Rather than providing an
objective determination of the desirability of agency activity, the
EcIS will reflect the ideology and bias of the agency. In addition, as
a procedural method of controlling the agency, the Act ignores the
realities of the decision-niaking process. In the hope of increasing
the rationality of the agency decisions, the Act requires a process
peripheral to the political forces and organizational values which
form a substantial part of the basis for agency decisions. The cost
of EcIS preparation, in terms of agency resources and time, clearly
outweighs any benefit the statement might produce in the
decision-making process.
Economic analysis can be useful as a check on agency discretion, but it should take the form of an assessment of predicted
impacts. The purpose should be seen as disclosure to the legislature and to the public of the factors influencing agency decisionmaking. Economic assessment can allow interested parties to understand the basis for a decision, but the economic effects alone
will rarely explain why an agency prefers a particular alternative.
Since economic assessment can adequately serve the more modest
goal of disclosure, the procedural protections designed to ensure
the integrity of the process should be correspondingly limited.
-William F. Flynn

